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1 INTRODUCTION 
Gamification is making its way to be part with learning as it is instructive and it 
could be fun. Cybergame was an idea to combine two things: learning and 
playing a game. What could be more fun than playing a game in school and 
still you get awarded with credits? The idea of this bachelor's thesis came 
from a senior lecturer Vesa Kankare at the Kymenlaakso University of Applied 
Sciences (KyUAS). This thesis is part of Cybergame project that requires 
strong protection from the outside network and needs to have separated secu-
rity layers to protect and pass the traffic within the game. Cybergame network 
is completely isolated within CyberLab's production network. CyberLab is a 
cybersecurity laboratory located in the Information Technology Department at 
KyUAS. In this thesis, two Cisco ASA 5515-X firewalls are used to make the 
security layers redundant. 
There are a few work-in-progress thesis works on Cybergame as it is a big 
project. The game itself is not ready but the network infrastructure for it almost 
is. This thesis is focused on the security layers in Cybergame network which 
are separated with firewalls. Other notable work-in-progress thesis' are virtual-
ization and Application Delivery Controllers in Cybergame network. Since 
those thesis' are part of the project, they are explained very shortly in this the-
sis. Published and the most recent thesis is Antti Peltonen's Application Deliv-
ery Controller Implementation to Cyberlab Data Center (Peltonen 2016). 
The firewalls were installed in Cybergame server rack in CyberLab and were 
connected together via failover-link so the redundancy can be configured later. 
After that, they were connected to two Cybergame switches with load balanc-
ing etherchannel to pass the normal network traffic between clients and Cy-
bergame. Finally, a management switch was installed and both firewalls were 
connected to it to separate normal network traffic from management traffic. 
After this introduction, Cybergame project design and some of its history will 
be explained in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 is "Terminology" which consists of most 
used terms or protocols in the thesis and are also explained.  Chapter 4 fo-
cuses on the implementing of firewalls to the Cybergame infrastructure and 
configuring them. Configurations are in appendices. 
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2 GYBERGAME PROJECT 
2.1 Project overview 
In early 2015 a project Cybersecurity Expertise and Business Developement 
was started to combine datacenter, gamification and cybersecurity knowledge. 
Some of the project's goals are new research and learning possibilities of cy-
bersecurity, Cybergame and CyberLab. The project is funded by European 
Regional Developement Fund (ERDF) (Euroopan aluekehitysrahasto 2014). 
CyberPros Academy was started in May 2015 with the cooperation of KyUAS, 
Lappeenranta University of Technology (LUT) and Cursor Ltd. Its idea is to 
create an environment to study different kind of cybersecurity threats and how 
to prevent them. For this the CyberLab laboratory and cybersecurity class 
room were created in KyUAS. This project has an extremely important role in 
studying cybersecurity today. (Rouhiainen & Kettunen 2015.) 
In the CyberLab environment it is also possible to do and study penetration 
testing and vulnerability scanning which are crucial part of cybersecurity today 
(Rouhiainen & Kettunen 2015). Antti Peltonen did a DDoS test as a part of his 
bachelor's thesis in CyberLab environment and the attack was made by stu-
dents mainly with TCP SYN flood and Slowloris (Peltonen 2016). 
Cybergame designing started in the late 2015 and the game will mainly be de-
veloped by students. Game designers will work on the game itself with help 
from GoodLife Technologies, a partner in the project. Networking students will 
work on the network infrastructure. (Rouhiainen & Kettunen 2015.) 
Cybergame is a gamified environment for learning cybersecurity and use of 
penetration techniques to bypass different security layers. The game consists 
of scenarios where players need to score points by completing steps, which 
are set by game developers. Usually, the main goal is to gain access to the 
target network and get information out of it using penetration testing tools, like 
in Kali Linux. (Peltonen 2016.) Steps can be like "get the password for user x" 
or "gain access to security cameras". 
The reason for the topic of the execution of this bachelor's thesis is that Cy-
bergame must be protected from malicious users so hacking the game itself 
will be more difficult. For example, the player database must be protected 
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from unauthorized access so no one can alter the scores. Now the network of 
the game is only available for the students of IT department and can only be 
accessed from the IT department network. Even though it is an inside net-
work, it is still seen as the untrusted network from the perspective of Cyber-
game network. 
 
2.2 Cybergame design 
Cybergame itself is protected from the Internet by Application Delivery Con-
trollers. Their function is to redirect traffic to servers and NEST (See chapter 
2.2.2 for more info), handle web security and DoS protection. ADCs will also 
perform SSL offloading for web-based services to reduce load from the serv-
ers and simplifies certificate management. 
North-South firewall (from least secure to most secure) will protect the flowing 
traffic through different security layers inside Cybergame datacenter. These 
security layers are separated by virtual firewalls and in Cisco ASA they are 
called contexts. Contexts are named Level1 and Level2, which will be ex-
plained in the implementation chapter. See figure 1 for Cybergame topology. 
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Figure 1. Cybergame topology 
 
2.2.1 Frontend 
Frontend is a server that hosts web interface for Cybergame. This is the inter-
face between user and game server (in this case, Backend. Chapter 2.2.3). 
Connections from Frontend towards Backend are allowed, while no other con-
nections are. Frontend is everything a user can see or interact with which 
makes it UI for the game. For example, when you access to Cybergame as a 
user, the first thing you face is Frontend. In Cybergame it is accessed via 
browser using a secured http -connection. After that, it will ask you to log in to 
authenticate yourself to access the game. 
 
2.2.2 NEST 
All the scenarios are run in the NEST network. NEST is a VM running hypervi-
sor (chapter 2.3) which runs all Cybergame scenarios and scenario VMs. 
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NEST is not allowed to initiate any connections, only Backend connections 
towards NEST are. After authenticating, a scenario can be chosen from the 
UI. If the scenario is completed or paused, it will store all the information to the 
database so the scenario can be replayed or resumed later. 
 
2.2.3 Backend 
The Backend is the database of the game where all the users' information is. 
User cannot see or interact with Backend but all the information is retrieved 
from there. Some of the information may be seen in UI (it is up to game devel-
opers how they want to make it) like completed scenarios and scores a 
player's got or someone else's high score on that specific scenario. A user 
must not have access to other users' information. 
 
2.2.4 Management 
Management is only used for management access and maintenance. Users 
that have privileges (mainly staff) can access the management interface. It 
can be used for example, monitoring or upgrading the system and security 
components which is why it is needed to be the most secure. Management is 
behind Backend, and is invisible to players. Management must be protected 
from unauthorized access and Internet access is denied. 
 
2.3 Virtualization in Cybergame 
In short, virtualization technology means that multiple VMs can be run on one 
computer. The resources of the host computer are shared with multiple oper-
ating systems. Resource sharing is handled by a hypervisor. (VMware N.d.) 
Hypervisors (or VMMs) are divided into two types. Type-1 hypervisor is a bare 
metal hypervisor that runs on top of hardware for example as an OS. Type-2 
hypervisor operates as an application on already existing OS. (Techtarget 
2010.) With virtualization technology, the need for hardware can be reduced 
which makes this cost-efficient solution. 
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In Cybergame, VMware ESXi is used and it is a type-1 hypervisor which 
makes it like an operating system. Four physical DELL-servers are used as 
hypervisors as all of them have ESXi installed. DELL-servers are also storage 
for Cybergame VMs which are installed on ESXi's. VMware vCenter was 
needed to manage and monitor the ESXi-servers. It is virtualized and is in-
stalled on one of the ESXi's. All the ESXi-servers were then added to vCenter 
library and were then added in to a cluster. Inside the cluster, ESXi-servers 
are using High Availability (HA) and load balancing. 
HA means that even if one of the ESXi's inside the cluster shuts down for 
whatever reason, all the VMs on that ESXi-server move to another ESXi-
server automatically. HA makes servers redundant. VMs can also be moved 
within the cluster while they are running. Load balancing means that vCenter's 
algorithm measures the load on all of the cluster's servers and balances them 
automatically. For instance, there are 100 VMs running on one of the ESXi's 
and zero VMs on all other three so vCenter balances them. 
Cybergame and all the scenarios will be virtualized and will be added to the 
Cybergame cluster. 
 
3 TERMINOLOGY 
The most used or important protocols and terms in this thesis are explained in 
this chapter. 
 
3.1 VLAN 
Local area network (LAN) consists of all the devices that are in the same 
broadcast-domain. This means that every device connected to the same 
broadcast-domain can receive broadcast-frames sent from other devices. A 
switch thinks that all of its access ports are in the same broadcast-domain, 
which means that all the devices connected to the switch are in the same local 
area network. To make the switch have more than one broadcast-domain, Vir-
tual LANs are needed to be made inside the switch. (Odom 2008, 10.) 
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Broadcast-frames are sent to every network device in the broadcast-domain 
so in a large broadcast-domain that would make a lot of traffic. For example in 
a company it would be a wise decision to split the broadcast-domain into 
smaller ones: for example management, staff and production, a subnet for 
each department. With VLANs devices from different departments can be 
connected to the same switch without making traffic that could interfere with 
other broadcast-domains. 
In Cybergame, there are four VLANs: NEST, Frontend, Backend and Man-
agement. Each of them has been assigned a different subnet with a prefix 
21xx: 
NEST: 172.16.0.0 /16 with a VLAN ID 2160 
Frontend: 172.18.0.0 /24 with a VLAN ID 2180 
Backend: 172.18.1.0 724 with a VLAN ID 2181 
Management 172.18.2.0 /24 with a VLAN ID 2182 
 
3.2 PVLAN 
Private VLAN divides a regular VLAN domain into subdomains. The regular 
VLAN domain is a primary VLAN and subdomains are secondary VLANs. 
These secondary VLANs are called an isolated VLAN and a community VLAN 
is seen in figure 2. All the PVLAN pairs share the same primary VLAN but can 
be separated from each other with secondary VLANs. Isolated VLAN means 
that ports associated with it cannot communicate with each other at the Layer 
2 level. In opposed to isolated VLAN ports, all ports in community VLAN can 
communicate with each other. However, community ports cannot communi-
cate with ports associated with other communities at the Layer2 level. (Cisco 
N.d.a.) 
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Figure 2. Private VLAN domain (Cisco N.d.a.) 
 
In Cybergame project, there are only isolated secondary VLANs with a prefix 
22xx: 
NEST 2260 
Frontend 2280 
Backend 2281 
Management 2282 
 
3.3 LACP 
LACP is link aggregation protocol to bundle physical links into a logical one 
(IEEE Standards Association 2001). With this protocol, the bandwidth be-
tween two devices can be increased and it has automatic load-balancing 
across the other operational links if a failure is detected in one link. Cisco has 
copyrighted term EtherChannel that is a link aggregation technology. Ether-
Channel is used in Cisco devices, which can be configured with LACP or with 
a Cisco proprietary protocol: Port Aggregation Protocol (PAgP). (Omnisecu 
N.d.) LACP is used in this work. 
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3.4 Multiple context mode 
A single ASA can be partitioned into multiple virtual firewalls, called security 
contexts. Each context is like an independent firewall with its own security 
policies, interfaces and management. This is equivalent to have multiple 
standalone devices. (Cisco N.d.d.) Multiple contexts have several pros and 
cons, which are listed below. 
Pros of multiple contexts: 
 Can be used if various departments or users need their own context or 
security policies 
 Hardware requirements 
 Active/Active failover (See chapter 3.5) 
Cons of multiple contexts: 
 No dynamic routing protocols, only static routes 
 No Threat Detection 
 No multicast routing 
 No VPN for remote access, only site-to-site VPN tunnel 
 No QoS (Cisco N.d.d.) 
After enabling multiple context mode and rebooting the device, it boots with 
system context, admin context and with additional security contexts depending 
on a license. The default license allows two additional security contexts. Sys-
tem context is used to configure each context configuration location, allocated 
interfaces and context operating parameters (startup configuration in single 
mode). If a user access to admin context, it gains privileges to access system 
context and all other contexts. Therefore, access to the admin context should 
be limited to appropriate users. (Cisco N.d.d.) 
 
3.5 Failover 
Failover is a HA technique. In failover, two devices are connected to each 
other with a cable, a dedicated failover link. Failover monitors the health of ac-
tive units and interfaces if specific conditions are met. If not, failover occurs. In 
order for failover to work, both devices need to be exactly the same: model, in-
terfaces, modules (if any) and have the same amount of RAM installed. Also 
on software: firewall mode (routed or transparent), context mode (single or 
multiple) and have the same software version. (Cisco N.d.e.) 
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Firewall routes all the traffic in the game so redundant firewall system is 
needed for this project in case the other one fails. This could be crucial as the 
game is used as a teaching platform. The scenarios could take time to com-
plete so it is very frustrating for the user (player) to lose all his/her progression 
in the game. 
Cisco ASA supports two types of failover: stateless and stateful. If a failover 
occurs in stateless failover, all connections that are active at the moment, are 
dropped and the connection is needed to re-establish again. The stateless 
failover is the regular failover. Both units use this failover link to communicate 
and determine the operating status of another unit. (Cisco N.d.e.) The connec-
tions which stateless failover passes to the other device, are listed below. 
Stateless failover supports: 
 Unit state (active/standby) 
 Hello-messages (keep-alive) 
 Network link status 
 MAC-address exchange 
 Configuration replication 
 Synchronization (Cisco N.d.e.) 
In stateful failover the active unit passes connection info continually to the 
standby unit. The new active unit keeps the same connection alive if failover 
occurs. If end-user applications are supported by this feature, they are not 
needed to be reconnected. (Cisco N.d.e.) The connections which stateful 
failover passes to the other device, are listed below. 
Stateful failover supports: 
 NAT translation table 
 TCP/UDP connection states 
 ARP table 
 L2 bridge table (in transparent firewall mode) 
 HTTP connection state (if HTTP replication is enabled) 
 ISAKMP and IPsec SA table 
 GTP PDP connection database 
 SIP signalling sessions 
 ICMP connection state 
 Dynamic Routing Protocols (Cisco N.d.e.) 
Stateless and stateful failovers can be used with both failover modes: Ac-
tive/Active and Active/Standby. (Cisco N.d.e.) 
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Active/Active failover mode can only be used in multiple context mode. Both 
ASAs pass traffic but security contexts are divided into two failover groups. 
Failover group is a logical group consisting of one or more security contexts. 
One group is active on the primary ASA and the other group is active on the 
secondary ASA. (Cisco N.d.e.) 
In Active/Standby failover mode, one unit is active and the second is in 
standby. Active unit passes traffic and if failover occurs, the active unit goes 
into standby and the standby unit goes active. Active/Standby can be used in 
both single and multiple context mode. (Cisco N.d.e.) 
More about failover and how it works in chapter 4.11, Failover test. 
3.6 SSH 
Secure Shell is a network protocol to be used in secured remote access. It is 
mainly used on Linux and Unix based systems but is also available for Win-
dows and Macintosh. SSH provides strong authentication, for example au-
thenticating a user using remote access. In addition, the encryption makes the 
connection so secure that it is almost impossible for an outsider to hijack the 
traffic or passwords. With SSH, executing commands or transferring files can 
be done between local and remote hosts. (IETF 2006.) 
 
3.7 RADIUS 
RADIUS is an authentication protocol that provides authentication, authoriza-
tion and accounting management for various network services. An access cli-
ent (end device, such as computer or laptop) is a device that is needed to ac-
cess a larger network. These access clients are connected to RADIUS clients 
(access servers) which provides access to a larger network. RADIUS clients 
could be for example switch or wireless access point. RADIUS client sends 
messages to RADIUS server that processes connection requests or account-
ing messages and sends back RADIUS message response. (Microsoft N.d.) 
3.8 ASDM 
ASDM is a GUI-based appliance manager for Cisco firewalls to be monitored 
and managed. It is accessed from a browser by using the management IP-
18 
 
address of the device as www-address. In addition, it uses secure connection 
(SSL) so https:// is needed. (Cisco N.d.c.) 
In this work, ASDM is used to configure access lists as it is much easier than 
with a console. Screenshots of used configurations are taken from ASDM in-
terface, for example interfaces as seen in figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. ASDM home menu 
 
3.9 NTP 
Network Time Protocol is used to synchronize the clocks of computers and 
devices to a specific time reference. If the clock of one system is ahead of the 
others, obviously the other systems are behind that. Isolated networks could 
run on their own time but when the network connects to the Internet, there 
might be some confusions, like an email from the "future". Without synchro-
nized time all log files are useless as the timestamps do not match. For exam-
ple billing and financial services. (NTP N.d.b.) 
If there is a security breach in the network, it is crucial to have all the devices 
in the same time. It is much easier to track down the origin of the breach by 
comparing timestamps in each device's logs, like a trail to follow. 
Identity Schemes can be used to identify remote systems. These schemes 
use encrypted keys between NTP servers (nodes in a large network) and cli-
ents to prevent any threats for example man-in-the-middle-attacks. Sequence 
of NTP servers is called proventic trail (certificate trail) which ends at trusted 
certificate authority. Schemes use only a few bit long keys so the keys should 
be updated constantly. (NTP N.d.a.) These Identity Schemes are listed below. 
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Identity Schemes: 
 Private Certificate (PC) 
 Trusted Certificate (TC) 
 Schnorr Identity Scheme (IFF) 
 Guillou-Quisquater Identity Scheme (CQ) 
 Mu-Varadhajarn Identity Scheme (NTP N.d.a.) 
Certificates are used in SSL encryption and if client's clock is out of certifi-
cate's time range (not usable yet or has been expired), it cannot validate it and 
therefore will be denied. 
NTP needs some reference clock that sets the true time. All devices in the 
network associated with NTP server uses the NTP as reference clock. NTP is 
a UDP based protocol and uses UTC as reference time. (NTP N.d.b.) NTP 
devices are configured with stratum levels, which are hierarchical. Stratum 0 
being the highest and 16 being the lowest. Stratum 1 gets the time from stra-
tum 0, stratum 2 gets the time from stratum 1 and so on. Stratum 0 is a 
source, for example a satellite (GPS) or an atomic clock. 
 
3.10 Tiny Core Linux (OS) 
Tiny Core is a very small Linux distribution that has all the basic functions. It 
can be as small as ten megabytes, which means that it can be stored and run 
from a storage device. As Tiny Core is very small, it does not come with any 
software so the users need to install whatever they need. (Tiny Core Team 
2007.) 
Installing Tiny Core to a hard drive is not the purpose of Tiny Core project. To 
make the system run fast and protecting the files from changing, it is loaded 
from a storage device to RAM. This makes sure that on every boot, the sys-
tem runs properly. This also means that by default, software is installed on 
RAM, which means that it gets wiped on reboot. (Kasanen 2013.) 
Tiny Core Linux is installed and virtualized in Cybergame cluster, thus making 
it keep all the changes and software installed if for some reason TC shuts 
down. In this work, Tiny Core Linux is only used for testing a ping from a sub-
net to another when access lists are configured. Each subnet except man-
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agement has its own TCL, which are given an IP-address from their own sub-
net with last byte being .95. Firewall will be used as a gateway. 
4 FIREWALL IMPLEMENTATION 
4.1 Cisco ASA 5515-X 
The dimensions (H x W x D) of Cisco ASA 5515-X are 4,24 x 42,9 x 39,5 cm. 
It is rack-mountable and its size is one rack unit.  ASA 5515-X can have 15 
000 connections per second and can have up to 100 configured VLANs. 
(Cisco N.d.b.) 
The device has six Gigabit Ethernet ports (1000Base-T) for normal network 
traffic. It has two ports for management access: one Gigabit Ethernet port and 
one console port. All of them can be connected with a RJ-45 connector. Addi-
tionally, it also has two four pin Hi-Speed USB-A for example, upgrading the 
flash. (Cisco N.d.b.) 
What is important for this work is that the 5515-X has two HA options: Ac-
tive/Active and Active/Standby of which the latter is used. The default licence 
also allows 5515-X to run in multiple context mode with two additional con-
texts in addition to System and Admin contexts. (Cisco N.d.b.) Multiple context 
mode is used in this work. 
 
4.2 Installation and initial configurations 
The work started by installing the firewalls (named CG-FW1 and CG-FW2) to 
the server rack and connecting the power supply to the equipment. Gigabit 
Ethernet interfaces one and two were connected to DELL switches (named 
CG-S1 and CG-S2) with SFP coppers as the DELL interfaces are Ten Gigabit 
Ethernet ports. Secondly, both ASAs were connected together via Gigabit 
Ethernet interfaces four and five in order to configure the failover later. Third 
step was to connect both firewalls into a management switch (named CG-
MGMT) using the management interface. Physical topology is shown in figure 
4. 
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 Figure 4. Physical topology  
 
After connecting the cables, a laptop was used to make the remote connection 
available. Both devices were named and were assigned IP addresses to the 
management interface: 172.18.2.23 for CG-FW1 and .24 for CG-FW2. At this 
point it is better to specify the standby management IP to CG-FW1 for the 
failover configuration later: 
ip address 172.18.2.23 255.255.255.0 standby 172.18.2.24 
If the standby management IP is missing when enabling the failover, the sec-
ondary unit will not respond as it copies all configurations from the primary 
unit, like assuming the IP and MAC addresses of the primary unit. 
Nameif is by default management in the management interface. The remote 
connection used firewall's local database at first so a local user had to be 
done with a command username x password x in global configuration mode. 
After creating the user, the remote connection could be set up in global con-
figuration mode: 
aaa authentication ssh console LOCAL 
crypto key generate rsa modulus 1024 
ssh "internal network" "network mask" management 
ssh version 2 
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At first, this did not work because a static route to the outside network was 
missing. This was fixed with a command route management 0 0 172.18.2.1. 
Unlike in other Cisco devices, in ASA you need to specify the interface 
(nameif) in the command. 
 
4.3 Logical topology 
The ASA 5515-X supports multiple context mode (base license is used) so 
both additional security contexts, Level1 and Level2, are used as virtual 
firewalls. Frontend and NEST are the least secure and Management is the 
most secure. Security levels on Level1 for Frontend/NEST is 0 and for 
Backend it is 100. On Level2, security levels for Backend is 0 and for 
Management it is 100. Logical topology of contexts and VLANs is seen in 
figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Logical topology 
 
The next phase was to set both firewalls into multiple context mode. Input the 
command mode multiple in global configuration mode. After inputting the 
command, devices were reloaded and both booted up with system, admin and 
two additional security contexts. Switching between contexts is done by using 
command changeto context contextname. Switching to system context is done 
by inputting changeto system. Both of these commands are used in privileged 
EXEC Mode. 
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4.4 Failover configuration 
To make both firewalls redundant, failover was next on the list. CG-FW1 will 
act as a primary unit and CG-FW2 will act as a secondary unit. Failover con-
figuration is done in system context in global configuration mode. LAN failover 
-link is named folink and a subnet used for failover-link is 172.18.4.0 /24. 
These commands are inputted in CG-FW1: 
failover lan unit primary 
failover lan interface folink g0/4 
failover lan interface ip folink 172.18.4.1 255.255.255.0 standby 172.18.4.2 
The first command tells the unit which one it will be, primary or secondary. 
The second command specifies the name of the failover-link and which physi-
cal interface it uses. The third command specifies the failover IP addresses of 
the active unit and the standby unit. The same commands were used in CG-
FW2 but with only changing the primary to secondary. 
After setting the LAN failover -link commands, it was necessary to make the 
protocol functional. First task to do was to use no shutdown command for g0/4 
interfaces in both devices in order the get the physical link up.  Then using the 
command failover in both devices in global configuration mode enables the 
failover and makes the protocol working as intended. 
From now on, configuring only the active unit is needed because the standby 
unit copies all configurations from the active unit. Configuring the standby unit 
will not replicate any configurations to the active unit. To force the standby unit 
to go into active mode, use the command failover active in global configuration 
mode in system context. 
As the idea of implementing the Stateful failover came up later, it was config-
ured in ASDM interface. Stateful failover was given a subnet 172.18.5.0 /24 
and was named  statelink. Both failovers can use the same interface but as 
there were no use for remaining interfaces, interface g0/5 was dedicated to 
statelink. This also load balances the traffic as both failovers have their own 
dedicated link. Configurations of both failovers can be seen in figure 6. 
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Figure 6. LAN Failover and State Failover in ASDM UI 
 
4.5 LACP configuration 
Next phase was to configure LACP, which is configured in system context. Gi-
gabit interfaces 0/1 and 0/2 were bundled together (as can be seen in figures 
4 or 8) and all the VLANs were assigned to that bundle link. The following 
commands were used to create the port-channel with LACP: 
interface gigabitethernet0/1 
description DC-SX_Te1/0/11 
channel-group 1 mode active 
The same commands were applied to G0/2 but in the description 11 was re-
placed with 12. To assign VLANs to the port-channel, they were created as 
sub-interfaces with the following commands: 
interface Port-channel1.2160 
description NEST 
The same commands were used with other VLANs (Frontend, Backend and 
Management) but sub-interface "ID" and description were replaced with the 
ones assigned to them. 
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4.6 Context configurations 
When the LACP port-channel was configured, virtual firewalls (Level1 and 
Level2) were configured. As you can see from figures 5 and 8: Level1 man-
ages traffic in Nest, Frontend and Backend; Level2 manages traffic in 
Backend and Management. Contexts were created in system in global con-
figuration mode with the following commands: 
context Level1 and for Level2, context Level2. 
When the context was created, sub-interfaces and VLANs were then needed 
to assign to proper contexts so they know which virtual firewall to use. These 
configurations (Level1 as an example) were applied with the following com-
mands: 
allocate-interface Port-channel1.2160 vlan2160 
allocate-interface Port-channel1.2180-2181 vlan2180-vlan2181 
Also for the context configuration to be stored into the system in boot, the fol-
lowing command needed to be applied: 
config-url disk0:/Level1.cfg 
See figure 7 for created security contexts seen from ASDM UI. 
Cisco configuration guide states that the config-url command has to be input-
ted last because it will save all its context configurations before that. If the 
command is inputted first, the system will load (for example in reboot) the con-
text but will not load any of the configurations like allocated interfaces. (Cisco 
N.d.d.) 
 
Figure 7. Security contexts in ASDM UI. 
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Final addition to context configurations was the IP addressing of the contexts 
or more likely, VLANs in this case. For each VLAN IP address, last byte was 
.5 for active and .6 for standby. The only exception was Backend on Level2. 
Backend works as an interface between Level1 and Level2 and therefore 
cannot use the same IP addressing on both. For Level2 context, Backend was 
allocated with .1 and .2. At this point security levels are also configured with 
the values said earlier. Configuring NEST on context Level1 as an example: 
interface vlan2160 
nameif NEST 
security-level 0 
ip address 172.16.0.5 255.255.0.0 standby 172.16.0.6 
After Level1 interfaces had been given an IP address, nameif and security 
level, Level2 was switched and configured like the same. See figure 8 for allo-
cated sub-interfaces. 
 
Figure 8. Physical connections and sub-interfaces to contexts 
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4.7 ASDM 
The configuration is very similar to SSH and to allow ASDM be used in fire-
walls, the following commands are needed: 
http server enable 
http "internal network" "network mask" management 
aaa authentication http console LOCAL 
 
4.8 Protocol configurations 
In this chapter various protocols are configured. These protocols are merely a 
slight addition to the work and are configured in admin context except NTP 
that is configured in system context. 
 
4.8.1 NTP 
Four of Funet's NTP servers were used in this work, which are used in most 
Finnish universities. Like in previous protocols, also in NTP's configuration 
commands the interface were specified and the "prefer" at the end is some-
what self-explanatory. See figure 9 for NTP configuration with ASDM and fig-
ure 10 for NTP status. 
ntp authenticate 
ntp server 193.166.5.197 source management prefer 
ntp server 193.166.5.207 source management 
ntp server 193.166.5.177 source management 
ntp server 193.166.5.217 source management 
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Figure 9. NTP configuration in ASDM UI 
 
 
Figure 10. NTP status and associates 
 
4.8.2 RADIUS 
When RADIUS privileges were configured in the server for the firewalls, the 
remote console access as local user could be removed, as it was a security 
risk. First, the firewalls were configured to use RADIUS protocol with a server-
group named RADIUS: 
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aaa-server RADIUS protocol radius 
aaa-server RADIUS (management) host "server IP" 
key xxx 
The second command specifies the interface the device is using and the RA-
DIUS-server IP-address. The third command is the RADIUS-key that is given 
from the server. Firewalls can be configured to use multiple RADIUS-servers 
in case one fails. 
Both SSH and ASDM were then configured to use RADIUS instead of a local 
database. First, the local database authentication was removed from both and 
RADIUS authentication was added instead: 
no aaa authentication ssh console LOCAL 
no aaa authentication http console LOCAL 
aaa authentication ssh console RADIUS 
aaa authentication http console RADIUS 
If RADIUS-servers are down for some reason, a local user was still kept but 
only restricted to a local console access as seen in figures 11 and 12. 
 
Figure 11. Local console access 
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Figure 12. Remote access with admin user 
 
4.8.3 Syslog 
Message logging was needed in the firewalls for them to send informational 
messages to already existing syslog-server. In the work, the messages are 
timestamped and shows which users have accessed (by default they are hid-
den) to the firewalls and which configurations they have made (if any). In Cy-
bergame design, firewalls were given local1 as identification, which means 
that facility code is 17. There are numerous options for logging as seen in fig-
ure 13. See figure 14 how syslog-messages are shown in the server. The fol-
lowing commands enable the logging to the server using the management-
interface: 
logging enable 
logging timestamp 
no logging hide username 
logging facility 17 
logging host management "server IP" 
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Figure 13. Syslog and its sub-categories in ASDM UI 
 
 
Figure 14. Syslog-messages in the server. 
 
4.9 PVLAN configuration 
In Cisco ASA devices, the PVLANs are considered secondary VLANs as seen 
in figure 15. Traffic received on the secondary VLAN will be redirected to the 
primary VLAN. PVLANs (VLAN NEST as a reference) were configured to sub-
interfaces in system context with the following commands: 
interface Port-channel1.2160 
vlan 2160 secondary 2260 
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Figure 15. Secondary VLAN configuration in ASDM UI 
 
4.10 ACLs 
By default, the global implicit rule in firewalls denies all traffic to whatever di-
rection. Then comes the implicit rule for security levels where traffic from a 
lower security level interface to a higher security level interface will also be 
blocked. To bypass these implicit rules, access lists are needed. In this work, 
the interfaces in need of access lists are Frontend and NEST on Level1 and 
Backend on Level2. See figure 18 for implicit rules. 
For testing purposes only, all IP traffic is permitted. The first sub-chapter is 
about testing the access-lists with ICMP ping to see they work. The second 
sub-chapter is about how to monitor the traffic and to see which type of traffic 
should be permitted with access lists. 
 
4.10.1 Creating and testing access lists 
The ACLs were configured in context’s firewall in ACL manager by clicking the 
Add and then Add ACL button. On Level1 the access lists were given names 
FE-> and NEST-> and on Level2 the ACL was named BE->. These ACLs are 
empty so in order for them to work, rules are needed to filter the traffic by se-
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lecting the ACL and clicking Add and then Add ACE. See figure 16 for created 
access lists with rules. 
 
Figure 16. Frontend and NEST ACLs on Level1 
 
After adding the rules to the ACLs, Tiny Core Linuxes were needed to verify 
that traffic would not be denied from subnet to another. Pings are successful 
on Level1 as seen in figures 17 and 18. 
 
Figure 17. Pings from a subnet NEST to Frontend and Backend 
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Figure 18. ACL rules and ping hits 
 
4.10.2 Monitoring traffic 
In Cybergame, we do not know which type of traffic there would be going so 
permitting all IP traffic was necessary. All traffic between subnets will be 
logged into a firewall's log buffer. Log buffer can be accessed from Monitoring 
tab. 
Two devices were needed: a www- and SSH-server and a client what is used 
to connect the server. Server was installed in Frontend and client was in-
stalled in NEST. Both devices were given an IP-address from their own subnet 
with last byte being .96.  In figures 19 and 20, the client has established con-
nection with the server. 
 
Figure 19. Apache default page seen from the client 
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Figure 20. SSH connection established by the client 
 
In this test, the traffic types are known so it was easier to find them in the log. 
As can be seen in figure 21, TCP connections with ports 22 and 80 from 
NEST to Frontend have been established. Timestamps are not synchronized 
(figures 20 and 21) as the server nor the client were configured with NTP. 
Next phase is to create access lists (figure 23) for http- and SSH-traffic and 
deleting the "permit all IP traffic". 
 
Figure 21. Log buffer in Cisco ASA 
 
 
Figure 22. New access lists 
 
4.11 Failover test 
A small test was conducted to see if the failover works by reloading the pri-
mary/active unit. Continuous ping without any parameters was sent from 
workstation to the primary/active firewall’s management address before re-
loading it. During that reload, three packets were dropped before ping reply 
was received. Approximately five seconds downtime before the secon-
dary/standby unit assumed the active role and its IP address 172.18.2.23 
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(Figure 23). During the reload, the IP address 172.18.2.24 was no more avail-
able and did not reply to ping. 
Cisco guide states that the standby unit assumes both IP and MAC addresses 
of the primary unit and begins the traffic passing. The former active unit is now 
in standby state and assumes IP and MAC address of the former standby unit. 
Devices in the network see no change in IP or MAC address table which 
means that no ARP entries change or no timeouts occur anywhere. (Cisco 
N.d.e.) 
If both devices boot up at the same time, the primary unit will assume the ac-
tive role. If the secondary device do not detect the primary device in boot, it 
will act as the active unit using its own MAC address, as it does not know the 
MAC address of the primary unit. When primary unit becomes available, the 
secondary (active) unit takes the MAC address of the primary unit which can 
cause error in the network as there are two devices with the same MAC ad-
dress. This can be avoided by generating virtual MAC addresses as seen in 
the figure 7. (Cisco N.d.e.) 
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Figure 23. Secondary unit as an active unit and primary unit as a standby unit. 
 
By looking at the “last failover at” in figure 23, it took two minutes before the 
former active unit was done with reloading and assumed the standby role and 
its IP address 172.18.2.24. Failover works as intended and the pri-
mary/standby unit was forced to be active again (figure 24). 
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Figure 24. Primary unit as an active unit again with failover history shown 
 
In other words, the North-South firewall is not redundant for at least two min-
utes as the former active unit boots up. The downtime for redundancy could 
be more if for example, the active unit’s input power is interrupted or failover 
link fails for some reason. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
The work was completed to the point where Cybergame needed it to be as the 
game itself was not ready. The access lists are at the moment in "permit any" 
state and are needed to change. As Cybergame is not finished, there is no 
traffic between VLANs or security contexts to know what traffic types will be 
permitted or denied. If detailed access lists are not factored in, the work can 
be considered as complete. 
Even though this work was part of Cybergame project, there was only a little 
communication with others who worked on the project as it did not seem to 
have an impact on the work. Only PVLAN configuration was done in collabora-
tion with someone working on a virtualization in Cybergame. That was as the 
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"someone" needed to check traffic between VMs in different PVLANs but to 
redirect the traffic, PVLANs were needed to configure in the firewall as it 
routes the traffic inside. 
The work itself was at first interesting and challenging as there was only a little 
experience with Cisco firewalls. Especially with the 5515-X model (that was 
used in the work) since the previous experience was with 5505 model. A lot of 
knowledge was gained about Cisco 5515-X but many features were left un-
covered.  
If Cybergame will be finished one day, the infrastructure for it will be almost 
ready. Maybe someone will work on the firewall(s) as a project (for thesis work 
there will not be much to do) and make proper access-lists or implement new 
ideas if needed.  
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     Appendix 1/1 
Admin-context configuration
CG-FW1/pri/act/admin# show startup-config 
 
hostname CG-FW1 
domain-name ictlab.kyamk.fi 
enable password 7illEt4F.u/O305N encrypted 
xlate per-session deny tcp any4 any4 
xlate per-session deny tcp any4 any6 
xlate per-session deny tcp any6 any4 
xlate per-session deny tcp any6 any6 
xlate per-session deny udp any4 any4 eq domain 
xlate per-session deny udp any4 any6 eq domain 
xlate per-session deny udp any6 any4 eq domain 
xlate per-session deny udp any6 any6 eq domain 
names 
 
interface Management0/0 
 management-only 
 nameif management 
 security-level 0 
 ip address 172.18.2.23 255.255.255.0 standby 172.18.2.24 
 
dns server-group DefaultDNS 
 domain-name ictlab.kyamk.fi 
pager lines 24 
logging enable 
logging timestamp 
no logging hide username 
logging standby 
logging monitor informational 
logging trap informational 
logging asdm informational 
logging facility 17 
logging host management 172.18.2.40 
 
mtu management 1500 
icmp unreachable rate-limit 1 burst-size 1 
no asdm history enable 
arp timeout 14400 
route management 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 172.18.2.1 1 
 
timeout xlate 3:00:00 
timeout pat-xlate 0:00:30 
timeout conn 1:00:00 half-closed 0:10:00 udp 0:02:00 sctp 0:02:00 icmp 0:00:02 
timeout sunrpc 0:10:00 h323 0:05:00 h225 1:00:00 mgcp 0:05:00 mgcp-pat 0:05:00 
timeout sip 0:30:00 sip_media 0:02:00 sip-invite 0:03:00 sip-disconnect 0:02:00 
timeout sip-provisional-media 0:02:00 uauth 0:05:00 absolute 
timeout tcp-proxy-reassembly 0:01:00 
timeout floating-conn 0:00:00 
 
aaa-server RADIUS protocol radius 
aaa-server RADIUS (management) host 193.167.x.x 
 key ***** 
aaa-server RADIUS (management) host 193.167.x.x 
 key ***** 
user-identity default-domain LOCAL 
aaa authentication ssh console RADIUS 
aaa authentication http console RADIUS 
aaa authentication enable console LOCAL 
aaa authorization command LOCAL 
aaa authorization exec authentication-server auto-enable 
http server enable 
http 10.69.0.0 255.255.0.0 management 
snmp-server host management 10.69.2.16 poll community ***** 
 
no snmp-server location 
no snmp-server contact 
snmp-server community ***** 
crypto ipsec security-association pmtu-aging infinite 
telnet timeout 5 
ssh stricthostkeycheck 
ssh 10.69.0.0 255.255.0.0 management 
ssh timeout 5 
ssh version 2 
ssh key-exchange group dh-group1-sha1 
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      Appendix 1/2 
no threat-detection statistics tcp-intercept 
username admin password Z3Fv03WhCsh.PGtN encrypted 
class-map inspection_default 
 match default-inspection-traffic 
 
policy-map type inspect dns preset_dns_map 
 parameters 
  message-length maximum client auto 
  message-length maximum 512 
policy-map global_policy 
 class inspection_default 
  inspect ftp 
  inspect h323 h225 
  inspect h323 ras 
  inspect ip-options 
  inspect netbios 
  inspect rsh 
  inspect rtsp 
  inspect skinny 
  inspect esmtp 
  inspect sqlnet 
  inspect sunrpc 
  inspect tftp 
  inspect sip 
  inspect xdmcp 
  inspect dns preset_dns_map 
policy-map type inspect dns migrated_dns_map_1 
 parameters 
  message-length maximum client auto 
  message-length maximum 512 
 
service-policy global_policy global 
Cryptochecksum:fd759e86670e87b5e60c2881ecb8cc6b 
: end 
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     Appendix 2/1 
System-context configuration 
CG-FW1/pri/act# show startup-config 
 
hostname CG-FW1 
domain-name ictlab.kyamk.fi 
enable password 7illEt4F.u/O305N encrypted 
mac-address auto prefix 43990 
 
interface GigabitEthernet0/0 
 description DC-SX_Te1/0/11 
 channel-group 1 mode active 
 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
 description DC-SX_Te1/0/12 
 channel-group 1 mode active 
 
interface GigabitEthernet0/2 
 shutdown 
 
interface GigabitEthernet0/3 
 shutdown 
 
interface GigabitEthernet0/4 
 description LAN Failover Interface 
 
interface GigabitEthernet0/5 
 description STATE Failover Interface 
 
interface Management0/0 
 
interface Port-channel1 
 description DC-SX_Po2 
 lacp max-bundle 8 
 
interface Port-channel1.2160 
 description NEST 
 vlan 2160 secondary 2260 
 
interface Port-channel1.2180 
 description Frontend 
 vlan 2180 secondary 2280 
 
interface Port-channel1.2181 
 description Backend 
 vlan 2181 secondary 2281 
 
interface Port-channel1.2182 
 description Management 
 vlan 2182 secondary 2282 
 
class default 
  limit-resource All 0 
  limit-resource Mac-addresses 16384 
  limit-resource ASDM 5 
  limit-resource SSH 5 
  limit-resource Telnet 5 
 
ftp mode passive 
pager lines 24 
failover 
failover lan unit primary 
failover lan interface folink GigabitEthernet0/4 
failover replication http 
failover link statelink GigabitEthernet0/5 
failover interface ip folink 172.18.4.1 255.255.255.0 standby 172.18.4.2 
failover interface ip statelink 172.18.5.1 255.255.255.0 standby 172.18.5.2 
no asdm history enable 
arp timeout 14400 
no arp permit-nonconnected 
ssh stricthostkeycheck 
console timeout 0 
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admin-context admin 
context admin 
  allocate-interface Management0/0  
 config-url disk0:/admin.cfg 
 
context Level2 
  allocate-interface Port-channel1.2181-Port-channel1.2182 vlan2181-vlan2182 
  config-url disk0:/Level2.cfg 
 
context Level1 
  allocate-interface Port-channel1.2160 vlan2160 
  allocate-interface Port-channel1.2180-Port-channel1.2181 vlan2180-vlan2181 
  config-url disk0:/Level1.cfg 
 
ntp authenticate 
ntp server 193.166.5.197 source management prefer 
ntp server 193.166.5.207 source management 
ntp server 193.166.5.177 source management 
ntp server 193.166.5.217 source management 
username admin password Z3Fv03WhCsh.PGtN encrypted 
prompt hostname priority state context 
no call-home reporting anonymous 
call-home 
 profile CiscoTAC-1 
  no active 
  destination address http https://tools.cisco.com/its/service/oddce/services/DDCEService 
  destination address email callhome@cisco.com 
  destination transport-method http 
  subscribe-to-alert-group diagnostic 
  subscribe-to-alert-group environment 
  subscribe-to-alert-group inventory periodic monthly 
  subscribe-to-alert-group configuration periodic monthly 
  subscribe-to-alert-group telemetry periodic daily 
Cryptochecksum:738dd6667fd53fa010f090b1f3a0d5a6 
: end 
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     Appendix 3/1 
Level1-context configuration 
CG-FW1/pri/act/Level1# sh startup-config 
 
hostname Level1 
enable password 8Ry2YjIyt7RRXU24 encrypted 
names 
 
interface vlan2160 
 nameif NEST 
 security-level 0 
 ip address 172.16.0.5 255.255.0.0 standby 172.16.0.6 
 
interface vlan2180 
 nameif Frontend 
 security-level 0 
 ip address 172.18.0.5 255.255.255.0 standby 172.18.0.6 
 
interface vlan2181 
 nameif Backend 
 security-level 100 
 ip address 172.18.1.5 255.255.255.0 standby 172.18.1.6 
 
same-security-traffic permit inter-interface 
same-security-traffic permit intra-interface 
access-list NEST-> extended permit ip 172.16.0.0 255.255.0.0 172.18.1.0 255.255.255.0 
access-list NEST-> extended permit ip 172.16.0.0 255.255.0.0 172.18.0.0 255.255.255.0 
access-list FE-> extended permit ip 172.18.0.0 255.255.255.0 172.18.1.0 255.255.255.0 
access-list FE-> extended permit ip 172.18.0.0 255.255.255.0 172.16.0.0 255.255.0.0 
pager lines 24 
logging enable 
logging timestamp 
no logging hide username 
logging asdm informational 
logging facility 17 
mtu NEST 1500 
mtu Frontend 1500 
mtu Backend 1500 
monitor-interface NEST 
monitor-interface Frontend 
monitor-interface Backend 
icmp unreachable rate-limit 1 burst-size 1 
no asdm history enable 
arp timeout 14400 
access-group NEST-> in interface NEST 
access-group FE-> in interface Frontend 
timeout xlate 3:00:00 
timeout pat-xlate 0:00:30 
timeout conn 1:00:00 half-closed 0:10:00 udp 0:02:00 sctp 0:02:00 icmp 0:00:02 
timeout sunrpc 0:10:00 h323 0:05:00 h225 1:00:00 mgcp 0:05:00 mgcp-pat 0:05:00 
timeout sip 0:30:00 sip_media 0:02:00 sip-invite 0:03:00 sip-disconnect 0:02:00 
timeout sip-provisional-media 0:02:00 uauth 0:05:00 absolute 
timeout tcp-proxy-reassembly 0:01:00 
timeout floating-conn 0:00:00 
user-identity default-domain LOCAL 
no snmp-server location 
no snmp-server contact 
crypto ipsec security-association pmtu-aging infinite 
telnet timeout 5 
ssh stricthostkeycheck 
ssh timeout 5 
ssh key-exchange group dh-group1-sha1 
no threat-detection statistics tcp-intercept 
  
47 
 
     Appendix 3/2 
class-map inspection_default 
 match default-inspection-traffic 
 
policy-map type inspect dns preset_dns_map 
 parameters 
  message-length maximum client auto 
  message-length maximum 512 
policy-map global_policy 
 class inspection_default 
  inspect dns preset_dns_map 
  inspect ftp 
  inspect h323 h225 
  inspect h323 ras 
  inspect ip-options 
  inspect netbios 
  inspect rsh 
  inspect rtsp 
  inspect skinny 
  inspect esmtp 
  inspect sqlnet 
  inspect sunrpc 
  inspect tftp 
  inspect sip 
  inspect xdmcp 
  inspect icmp 
  inspect icmp error 
 
service-policy global_policy global 
Cryptochecksum:f15d2d6881913d91aae88bd416faf1a4 
: end 
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     Appendix 4/1 
Level2-context configuration 
CG-FW1/pri/act/Level2# show startup-config 
 
hostname Level2 
enable password 8Ry2YjIyt7RRXU24 encrypted 
names 
 
interface vlan2181 
 nameif Backend 
 security-level 0 
 ip address 172.18.1.1 255.255.255.0 standby 172.18.1.2 
 
interface vlan2182 
 nameif MGMT 
 security-level 100 
 ip address 172.18.2.5 255.255.255.0 standby 172.18.2.6 
 
same-security-traffic permit inter-interface 
same-security-traffic permit intra-interface 
access-list BE-> extended permit ip 172.18.1.0 255.255.255.0 172.18.2.0 255.255.255.0 
access-list BE-> extended permit ip 172.18.1.0 255.255.255.0 172.18.1.0 255.255.255.0 
pager lines 24 
logging enable 
logging timestamp 
no logging hide username 
logging asdm informational 
logging facility 17 
mtu Backend 1500 
mtu MGMT 1500 
monitor-interface Backend 
monitor-interface MGMT 
icmp unreachable rate-limit 1 burst-size 1 
no asdm history enable 
arp timeout 14400 
access-group BE-> in interface Backend 
timeout xlate 3:00:00 
timeout pat-xlate 0:00:30 
timeout conn 1:00:00 half-closed 0:10:00 udp 0:02:00 sctp 0:02:00 icmp 0:00:02 
timeout sunrpc 0:10:00 h323 0:05:00 h225 1:00:00 mgcp 0:05:00 mgcp-pat 0:05:00 
timeout sip 0:30:00 sip_media 0:02:00 sip-invite 0:03:00 sip-disconnect 0:02:00 
timeout sip-provisional-media 0:02:00 uauth 0:05:00 absolute 
timeout tcp-proxy-reassembly 0:01:00 
timeout floating-conn 0:00:00 
user-identity default-domain LOCAL 
no snmp-server location 
no snmp-server contact 
crypto ipsec security-association pmtu-aging infinite 
telnet timeout 5 
ssh stricthostkeycheck 
ssh timeout 5 
ssh key-exchange group dh-group1-sha1 
no threat-detection statistics tcp-intercept 
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     Appendix 4/2 
class-map inspection_default 
 match default-inspection-traffic 
 
policy-map type inspect dns preset_dns_map 
 parameters 
  message-length maximum client auto 
  message-length maximum 512 
policy-map global_policy 
 class inspection_default 
  inspect dns preset_dns_map 
  inspect ftp 
  inspect h323 h225 
  inspect h323 ras 
  inspect ip-options 
  inspect netbios 
  inspect rsh 
  inspect rtsp 
  inspect skinny 
  inspect esmtp 
  inspect sqlnet 
  inspect sunrpc 
  inspect tftp 
  inspect sip 
  inspect xdmcp 
  inspect icmp 
  inspect icmp error 
 
service-policy global_policy global 
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: end 
